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Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard
Summary
This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective
reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for
regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that
a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a
barrier to entry.
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When food operators sell generic products, consumers partly base their
choices on the reputation of the entire industry. For instance, following an
outbreak of food poisoning, everyone along the contaminated item’s supply chain may suffer the consequences of a decrease in demand. The problem arises when consumers do not link the contamination to a particular
producer but to a generic product. After the Fall 2006 spinach outbreak,
the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture reported that all US spinach growers suffered a drop in demand for
their product even though only one grower’s spinach was contaminated.
Five months later, the value of retail sales was still down 27% compared to
the same period in 2005 (Calvin 2007). In another example from 1997, more
than 200 people contracted hepatitis A after eating frozen strawberries. The
USDA reported that concerns over the safety of strawberries affected demand for all berries. Experts estimated that the US berries industry bore
losses of between $15 million and $40 million dollars due to the outbreak
(Calvin, Avendaño and Schwentesius 2004). In 2003, following the discovery of the first cow infected by Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the
USA, more than 30 countries banned US beef, threatening the 2.6 billion
dollars export market. Using UPC scanner data, Schlenker and Villas-Boas
(2007) show evidence of a drop in domestic beef sales as well.
The literature points out that a collective reputation is at stake in food industries in which food operators sell speciality or regional products (Winfree and McCluskey 2005). This is particularly true when consumers cannot
identify the producer of a food product and/or food items are not traceable. Collective reputation has two main characteristics. First, producers
are hostage to each others’ behavior. Namely, an entire group of firms can
lose consumer trust as a result of one firm’s lack of diligence. Second, collective reputation induces price premiums on the market. There are many
empirical evidence which show that a positive collective reputation is a
good tool to signal quality and is correlated with price premiums (Quagrainie, Mc Cluskey and Loureiro 2003). Price premiums work as incentives for food operators to join the group.
There is little formal discussion in the literature about collective reputation.
Tirole (1996) considers that collective reputation should be assumed to be
the aggregate reputation of individual agents. In a context of imperfect
information available to consumers about quality, he shows that the composition of the producer group matters. Winfree and Mc Cluskey (2005)
assume that collective reputation is a common property resource and show
that the number of firms should be considered closely because of free-rider
effects. However, neither study allows for entry in or exit from the group
2
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of producers whose size is taken as fixed.
The current article addresses the issue of free-entry when food operators
share a collective reputation (the industry reputation) in a context of imperfect information about product quality available to consumers. We show
that free entry is not socially optimal due to the producers’ incentive to freeride on the collective reputation. This statement supports the introduction
of a minimum quality standard (MQS) to correct this market failure. In the
industrial organization literature, there is a controversial debate regarding
the effect of a MQS on competition (see Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), Valetti (2000) for competition
effects of a MQS under perfect information for consumers about quality;
see Leland (1979), Garella and Petrakis (2006) for competition effects of a
MQS under imperfect information). In contrast to existing literature on the
negative competition effects of a MQS, we show that in a context of imperfect information for consumers about quality, the introduction of a MQS
can induce firms to enter the market.
The article proceeds as follows. In the light of empirical evidence, we set up
the theoretical model emphasizing the free entry issue. Next, we analyze
the competition effects when a MQS is imposed on the industry. Finally,
we provide our conclusions and their policy implications.

Oligopoly with collective reputation
We consider an industry in which identical and risk neutral food operators
sell generic products. In this case, if a quality failure occurs the collective
reputation at stake is the reputation of the entire industry. We consider a
two-stage game: in the first stage, profit maximizing firms choose whether
or not to enter the market. When a firm enters the market, it faces a fixed
(sunk) cost F > 0. In the second stage, the firm makes a quality decision in
order to avoid quality failure, thereby contributing to the collective reputation of the industry. Once they have entered the market and paid the sunk
cost F , firms face a cost C (:) of providing quality with C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0.
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) analyze a situation in which firms produce
an homogeneous product and the output per firm (strictly) decreases with
the number of firms. Since we focus on the role of collective reputation, in
our setting each firm produces one unit of the product.
Consumers only are able to imperfectly observe the average quality qa of
the product marketed. We thus assume that the reputation of the industry
is "good" with a probability R (qa ), with R0 > 0 and R00
0. The inverse
3
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demand function is then P (n) (with P 0 < 0). The industry reputation is
"bad" with probability 1 R (qa ) and consequently demand drops to 0.
Therefore, the expected profit of a generic firm i is i = R (qa ) P (n)
C (qi ) F . We solve the game through backward induction. In the next
section, we first present two reasonable assumptions from the monopolistic
case. We then examine the oligopoly situation.

Monopolist Processor
We start our analysis by considering the case where there is only one firm in
the market. In the second stage, the monopolistic firm makes a quality decision q in order to maximize its profit; M ax R (q) PM C (q) ; where PM =
q

P (1). The corresponding first order condition is as follows R0 (qM ) PM =
C 0 (qM ). In the first stage, the monopoly payoff is given by (qM ; 1) =
R (qM ) PM C (qM ) F . Let consider the two following assumptions:
Assumption 1: F R (qM ) PM C (qM ) :
Assumption 2: lim
(q; 1) 0:
q!+1

Assumption 1 states that a firm always enters the market when it foresees
that no other firm would do so. According to assumption 2, a monopolistic firm cannot make any profit when its investment in quality reaches
a certain level. All through the article, we assume that Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2 hold. We now analyze the situation where more than one
firm enter the market.

Oligopolist Processor
Proceeding with our analysis, we consider that n identical firms enter the
market. These firms produce a homogeneous good and share a collective
reputation. According to the latter statement, the entire industry can fail if
one firm misbehaves (Winfree and Mc Cluskey 2005; Carriquiry and Babcock, 2007). First, we consider that firms make their quality decision, taking
the decisions of the others as given. Second, we examine the welfare effects
of competition.
Collective Reputation and Quality
In the second-stage, firms individually make their quality decision, qi , in
order to prevent a drop in demand. The second-stage problem for a firm

4

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 171 [2008]

n

i is then M ax R (qa ) P (n)
qi

C (qi ), where qa =

i=1

qi

n

. The first order con-

dition is n1 R0 (qa ) P (n) = C 0 (qi ). It defines firm i0 s best response as an
implicit function of the average quality level qa and the number of firms
n. Hence, each firm has an incentive to decrease its quality if the average
quality increases.
In an interior equilibrium, the firms’ quality decisions are all the same, i.e.
for all i, qi = q (n) which is characterized by:
1 0
R (q ) P (n) = C 0 (q ) ;
n

(1)

q represents the non cooperative equilibrium quality level.
Proposition 1 An increase in the number of firms lowers the equilibrium quality
level q : @q
@n < 0.
Proof. Differentiating condition 1 with respect to n we obtain
(2)

@q
1 0
=
P (n)
@n
n

1
R0 (q )
P
(n)
;
n2
C 00 (q ) n1 R00 (q ) P (n)

This expression has a negative value. Indeed, P 0 < 0, then n1 P 0 (n) n12 P (n) <
0: Moreover, R0 (q ) > 0 and C 00 (q ) n1 R00 (q ) P (n) > 0.
We distinguish two effects. On the one hand, when the number of firms
in the market increases, the firms’ incentive to provide quality decreases.
This effect is identical to the findings of Winfree and Mc Cluskey (2005).
On the other hand, competition strengthens and the price of the product
consequently decreases. A firm’s benefits are thus diluted and each firm
provides a lower level of quality.
In the first stage, firms decide to enter the market if their ex-ante expected
profit is positive. The number of firms who enter the market is then characterized by:
(3)

R (q (n )) P (n )

C (q (n )) = F;

Where n denotes the equilibrium number of firms, which is an implicit
function of F , the sunk costs of entry. Differentiating condition 3 with reh
i 1
0 (q ) P (n )
0 (q )] @q + R (q ) P 0 (n )
spect to F we obtain: @n
=
[R
C
.
@F
@n
By definition, P 0 < 0. From condition (1), R0 (q ) P (n )

C 0 (q )

0 and

5
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@n
according to Proposition 1, @q
@n < 0. Then, @F < 0. Consequently, the size
of the industry decreases as the entry cost increases.
With these results in hand, we turn to the welfare effect of competition.

The ambiguous welfare effect
In order to appraise the welfare effect of a change in the number of firms,
we consider the first stage equilibrium.
If n firms enter the market, they anticipate that they will implement the
non cooperative equilibrium quality level q in the second stage. Under
the assumption of quasi-linear consumer utility, the consumer’s surplus is
Rn
CS (q ; n) = R (q ) P (s) ds P (n) n . The total ex-ante profit of the
0

industry is n (q ; n) = n [R (q ) P (n) C (q ) F ] where (q ; n) represents the first stage equilibrium profit per firm. The social welfare is denoted by W = W (q ; n), with W (q ; n) such that:
(4)

W (q ; n) = R (q )

Zn

P (s) ds

n [C (q ) + F ] ;

0

We can now evaluate the welfare effect of competition. Differentiating con@W
@W @q
dition 4 with respect to n, we obtain dW
dn = @n + @q @n . The welfare effect
is twofold. The direct effect is given by @W
[C(q ) + F ].
@n = R(q )P (n)
As long as profits remain non negative, @W
has
a
non
negative
value. This
@n
represents the classical positive effect of competition. The indirect effect is
@q
given by @W
@q @n . According to Proposition 1, the average quality on the
effect of an increase in quality,
n C 0 (q ). P (n ) <

n
R

@W
@q ,

is given by

@W
@q

@q
@n

< 0. The welfare
n
R
= R0 (q ) P (s) ds

market decreases with respect to the number of firms,

0

P (s) ds, thus this term has a positive value. There-

0

@q
fore, the indirect welfare effect @W
@q @n has a negative value.
When food operators share a collective reputation, the welfare effect of
competition is ambiguous. An increase in the number of firms reduces each
firm’s market power and prices, thereby improving social welfare. Yet at
the same time, it lowers the average quality on the market, reducing social
welfare.

Proposition 2 Free entry is not socially optimal.
6
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Proof. We evaluate the marginal variation of welfare at the free entry
point. Differentiating condition
4 with respect to the #
number of firms n;
"
n
R
0
we obtain dW
n C 0 (q ) @q
dn (q ; n ) = R (q ) P (s) ds
@n : According to
0

Proposition 1 and that

@W
@q

= R0 (q )

n
R

P (s) ds

n C 0 (q ) > 0, this expres-

0

sion has a strict negative value.
Numerical example: We consider the following specification of the model.
The collective reputation is characterized by a logit function of the average
qa
. The inverse demand function is assumed to be
quality, qa : R (qa ) = 1+q
a
linear, P (n) =
n where > 0. The cost function to provide quality is
C (qi ) = 21 (1 + qi )2 . The individual ex ante profit function can be written
1
h
i
2
( nn ) 3 1
1
n 3
(
n)
as (q (n) ; n) =
+
F
. Consumer surplus
1
2
n
( nn ) 3
1
( n n ) 3 1 n2
is given by CS (q (n) ; n) =
1
2 . Therefore, the social welfare is:
( nn ) 3
1
h
i
2
( n)3 1
n
n 3
1
W (q (n) ; n) = n
n
n
+
F
. Figure 1 represents
1
2
2
n
( nn ) 3
the ambiguous welfare effects of competition.
Welfare

W

CS
Profits

n
Figure 1. The Welfare Effects of Competition
When n firms compete in the market, the positive welfare effect of competition disappears. Therefore, the regulator needs to intervene in order to
avoid free-riding incentives and to prevent the entire industry from failing
to perform. This result contributes to the critical debate in the industrial
organization literature concerning the justification of anti-competitive regulation. For instance, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have shown that in
7
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homogeneous product markets, free entry can lead to a socially excessive
number of firms. They model a situation in which the output per firm falls
as the number of firms in the industry increases. In our model, we assume
that the output per firm is constant, however, the free-riding incentives on
collective reputation lead us to the same conclusion. A minimum quality
standard is the most commonly used regulatory tool in the food industry,
guaranteeing product quality/safety (Marette 2007). In the next section,
we examine the competition effects when a minimum quality standard is
introduced by the regulator.

Minimum Quality Standard
While maintaining our focus on the entry issue, we examine the situation
where the regulator imposes a Minimum Quality Standard.

Magnitude of the MQS
First, we characterize a particular quality choice, qc , which is the cooperative equilibrium quality in the second stage. This level is the solution
of M ax R (q) P (n) C (q), leading to the following first order condition
q 0

R0 (qc ) P (n) C 0 (qc ) = 0. Note that qc represents the optimal quality level
for the industry.
Second, we assume that the regulator imposes a MQS denoted by qs . qs is
exogenous and common knowledge. Firms make their entry and quality
decisions according to the magnitude of qs . Food operators are ordered to
implement a quality level qi such that qi qs . Let q = q (n ) denote the
non cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium quality level.
Proposition 3 If qs q , the MQS has no effect on competition, i.e. the number
of firms is n ; There exists q 0
qc such that for q
qs
q 0 , the number of
0
firms is higher than n and for qs q , the number of firms is lower than n . The
number of firms is maximal for qs = qc .
Proof. When the MQS is lower than the equilibrium non cooperative
quality level qs
q , firms implement the (non cooperative) subgame
perfect equilibrium quality level q and the number of firms in the market remains n . When the MQS is higher than the (non cooperative) subgame perfect equilibrium quality level qs
q , let nm denote the number of firms who enter the market. It is characterized by (qs ; nm ) =
8
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R (qs ) P (nm )

C (qs )

F = 0. Differentiating the latter condition with
(@ )

@qs
@
m
respect to MQS level qs , we obtain: dn
. As usual @n
< 0. Then,
@
dqs =
m
@nm
n
o
n o
@
m
= sign @q
. The number of firms nm increases when q
sign dn
dqs
s
qs
qc and decreases when the MQS level is higher than the cooperative
equilibrium quality level qc . By assumption, P 0 < 0 and (qs ; n)
(qs ; 1).
Consequently, lim
(qs ; n)
lim
(qs ; 1). From Assumption 2

q m !+1

(monopolist case), we conclude that
0. Finally,

lim nm

q m !+1

q m !+1

lim

q m !+1

(qs ; 1)

lim

q m !+1

(qs ; nm ) =

1: Accordingly, there exists q 0 which satisfies the

conditions set in the proposition (see Figure 2).
If the MQS is sufficiently low, it does not influence either competition or
the firm’s quality choice. Increasing the level of the MQS raises the level of
the collective reputation by increasing firms’ quality level. The MQS does
not alter competition and induces firms to enter the market as long as the
cost of providing the MQS level is sufficiently low. At the cooperative equilibrium quality level (qc ), the collective reputation and the total profit are
maximal. When the MQS is imposed at such a level, a maximum number
of firms enter the market.
For MQS levels higher than the cooperative level, the marginal cost of providing quality overcomes the marginal benefit, leading to a drop in profits.
Consequently, the MQS alters competition and less firms enter the market.
The number of firms remains higher than it would under free entry as long
as the MQS is low enough (up to q 0 ). For higher MQS levels, the number of
firms becomes less than the number of firms at the free entry point. This is
the only situation in which the MQS can alter competition. Figure 2 illustrates these results.

nm

n*

q**

q'

qc

qs

9
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Figure 2. Number of Firms and MQS.
In the light of these statements, we turn now to analyze the welfare effect
after a MQS has been imposed.

Welfare effect of the MQS
The welfare function at the free entry point when there are n firms in the
industry who have implemented the non cooperative quality level equal to
q = q" (n ), can be written#W (q ; n ) =
n
R
R(q )
P (s)ds n P (n ) . At the free entry point, if the MQS is such
0

q 0 , ns firms operate in the industry and the welfare is given
n
Rs
by W (qs ; ns ) = R(qs )
P (s)ds ns P (ns ) . Namely, R(q ) R(qs ). There-

that q

qs

0

fore, average quality is higher once a MQS has been introduced. The MQS
increases competition, there are more firms in the industry (n
ns ) which
n
n
R
Rs
increases consumers’ surplus. Therefore, P (s)ds n P (n )
P (s)ds
0

0

ns P (ns ). Relative to free entry, the introduction of a MQS improves welfare as long as the level of the MQS leads to a greater number of active
firms. This result adds another dimension to previous conclusions on minimum quality standards and collective reputation. Winfree and Mc Cluskey
(2005) argue that when firms share a collective reputation, the introduction
of MQS limits incentives to free-ride. The minimum quality standard is
then Pareto improving for firms but they do not take into account a competition effect.

Conclusion
The issue of collective reputation is not exclusive to firms who sell regional
or specialty products. Collective reputation may be at stake when food operators sell food items that consumers consider as generic. For instance, an
entire industry may suffer decreased demand following a food safety outbreak. In order to prevent quality and safety failures, food operators endeavour to sustain an accurate level of quality in the market. However, the
more firms there are in the industry, the greater the incentive to free-ride on
the quality of others. We show that free-entry leads to a sub-optimal number of firms in the market. Therefore, the regulator needs to intervene in
order to avoid the incentive to free-ride and to prevent the entire industry
10
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from failing to perform. A solution could be to restrict the number of firms
in the market. However, such regulation would lead to an increase in price.
Moreover, it would limit the incentive to free ride but it won’t eliminate it.
This statement supports the introduction of a minimum quality standard
in the industry. Indeed, a minimum quality standard allows to avoid both
negative welfare effects of the latter policy.
By focusing on entry, this article provides new results for research on collective reputation and minimum quality standards. We show that the introduction of a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the
market and consequently it does not always alter competition, sustaining
both the average quality in the industry and the level of welfare. To conclude, minimum quality standards should not be systematically considered
by the regulator as an anti-competitive regulation.

11
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